How Conflict Affects Education: Differences across Types of Conflict in Nigeria

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Abstract:

We investigate effects of conflict on educational attainment in Nigeria, a country suffering from different types of conflict: the Boko Haram insurgency as well as violence between farmers and herders. These two conflicts involve different perpetrators having differing goals and using different tactics. To what extent do the effects from these two types of conflict on education differ? Employing a difference-in-difference technique, we find both types lower educational attainment but conflict between farmers and herders has stronger effects. This is surprising given the ideological drive of Boko Haram to confront western education.

Keywords: Conflict; Education; Nigeria

JEL Codes: D1, D74, I20.

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1. Introduction

Many document the negative effect that conflict has on education (Swee, 2015; Pivovarova and Swee, 2014; Di Maio and Nandi, 2013; Verwimp and Van Bavel, 2013; Justino et al. 2014; Shemyakina, 2011; Chamarbagwala and Moran, 2011; and Unfries and Kis-Katos (2020). Bertoni et al. (2019) focus on Nigeria and examine the effects of conflict from the Boko Haram (BH) insurgency on education. They find that attacks from BH lowered both enrollment and completed years of education in the Northeast of Nigeria. However, Bertoni et al. (2019) compare the effects of BH conflict to the absence of any other form of conflict thereby removing other types of conflict, such as the conflict between farmers and herders, from their analysis. Such a removal is appropriate given the comparison between the effects of BH conflict and no conflict.

However, one might also ask how the effects of conflict arising out of the BH insurgency compare to other types of conflict such as farmers and herders (FH) fighting over land. Does the same intensity of conflict have similar effects on educational outcomes or is one type more pernicious than another? Nigeria allows for an interesting case study as both types of conflict occur concurrently, allowing one to compare effects from the two types of conflict on completed years of schooling. These two types of conflict are quite distinct. First, they differ in ideology. BH is anti-western. In fact, the name 'Boko Haram' can be translated as 'western education is forbidden'. BH insurgents have even carried out direct attacks on schools. On the other hand, FH clashes stem from resource scarcity going back centuries. Second, the antagonists differ. BH is a terrorist insurgency, attacking civilian targets but also battling government forces and so thereby exemplifying a military conflict. FH conflict pits two groups of civilians against one another but generally with less coordination across combatants. That is, raids between farmers and herders in one location would have few direct links with clashes between these two groups in other locations,

especially locations far away from one another. Finally, these types of conflict generally occur in different regions. BH insurgent activities are concentrated in the northeastern part of Nigeria as seen in figure 1 while the FH conflict is more concentrated in the central region as shown in figure 2.

Our study makes two contributions. First and more specifically, it considers how conflict within Nigeria has impacted educational outcomes within that country, comparing the effects of two distinct types of conflict. Second and more generally, findings from this study extend beyond the case of Nigeria, as comparing the effects from these two types of conflict holds implications for applying results from past studies. A question from studies examining conflict from a particular setting is to what extent findings apply to other countries and time periods where details behind the conflict differ. If findings from BH conflict match those of FH conflict then this would suggest that the conflict itself is what drives outcomes and details surrounding that conflict are less relevant. Findings from one study are then more likely to apply to conflict events in other countries. On the other hand, if conflict from BH has distinct effects on educational outcomes than does conflict from FH even within the same country during the same sample period, one might then be more hesitant to extrapolate findings from a case study of country A to that of country B. Therefore, in addition to better understanding how different types of conflict impact educational outcomes within Nigeria, results from this paper can also shed light on to what extent findings from other papers could generalize.

From the above descriptions, one might conclude that conflict from the BH insurgency will have greater effects on educational outcomes. However, to the extent that FH conflict draws resources such as labor out of productive activities – including schooling to gain human capital – then how the two compare is not as clear. Moreover, FH conflict claimed more lives during the

period we consider as the International Crisis Group (2018) claimed it was six times deadlier than the BH insurgence in 2018. Interestingly, our results show greater effects from FH conflict, implying that fights over resources, especially for those near subsistence, could have stronger effects on educational outcomes than ideologically driven conflicts, even ones where combatants target education.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes both types of conflict in Nigeria along with the educational system. Section 3 presents the empirical model and section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses results, and a conclusion follows.

2. Conflict and Education in Nigeria

A. *Conflict*

BH-driven conflict arose in northeast Nigeria in 2009 and increased until 2012 and has since fluctuated in intensity. Anti-western in its views, attacks were often targeted on schools and students to weaken educational institutions although the ultimate goal is to establish an Islamic state. Combatants usually involve BH members and government security forces. FH conflict goes back millennia and exemplifies a conflict over resources where herding tramples crops, pitting these two groups against one another. FH conflict grew in Nigeria (as well as in neighboring countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso) due to population pressure and adverse weather conditions. Not only did the number of herders increase but the reduction of agricultural land due to adverse weather brought more area into dispute. FH conflict further intensified after 2016 as drought forced more herders south into the central part of Nigeria thereby fomenting conflict where it had been less prevalent (Day and Caus, 2020). The BH conflict in the northeast could have contributed to FH conflict as the displacement of people caused further southward migration that

increased land disputes, especially since property rights were not clearly defined. Governing institutions proved unable to prevent these land disputes. Brottem (2021) argues that political institutions do not sufficiently include non-sedentary herders in discussions to find solutions to these conflicts. Government security forces tasked with staying above the conflict and keeping the peace were too often viewed by herders as siding with farmers. Given that many of the herders come from the Fulani ethnic group who are Muslims and many of the farmers are from differing ethnic groups and are Christians, these ethnoreligious aspects added another dimension to this conflict, dimensions aside from disputes over land. Nnaji et al. (2022) find that these conflicts have led to increased food insecurity.

Differences between BH and FH conflict arise not just over the reasons for the conflict but spatially and intertemporally. Figures 1 and 2 provide a spatial distribution of BH and FH conflict, respectively, from 2010 to 2018.[1] Whereas BH conflict is confined to the northeast of the country, FH is more prevalent in central regions and also more spread out, occurring in both the northeast and south.

[1] Data for both types of conflict is from ACLED.

Figure 1: Boko Haram conflict events from 2010 to 2018.



Figure 2: Farmer-Herder conflict events from 2010 to 2018.



Although BH insurgency has led to 10 million people needing humanitarian assistance (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2018), FH conflict has actually claimed more lives in recent years (International Crisis Group, 2018).

Figure 3: Conflict events over time



Figure 3 shows the number of conflict events for each type of conflict over time. The BH insurgency began in 2009 and so events number zero prior to this. The conflict intensified from 2009 to 2012, waned after 2014, but then somewhat rebounded in 2016. FH conflict also increased after 2009 but at a more gradual pace before spiking in 2018.

The nature of BH attacks tends to be coordinated with organized attacks on civilians, government properties, schools, worship centers, and other established institutions. In return, the Nigerian army also coordinates reprisal attacks. The ACLED data provides notes for conflict events. Three of these notes read:

- *'A Boko Haram school bomb kills two civilians, including an Islamic scholar.'*
- *'Attackers with guns and explosives raided a jail in a restive Nigerian city on Sunday, leaving four prison guards dead and freeing 40 inmates. Boko Haram is blamed. The gunmen also attacked a school in the town.'*
- *'On 6 August, the Nigerian army repelled an attack coordinated by Boko Haram insurgents on a military formation at Gundari, Guzamala Local Government Area of Borno. 7 BH men killed and 8 soldiers wounded.'*

FH conflict involves more uncoordinated conflict events. Herders comprise mostly nomads who graze their livestock (mostly cows) while farmers live in defined settlements. These conflicts often take the form of raids. For instance, a herder group might graze their cows onto farmland thereby destroying crops and triggering an attack by farmers on both the herders and their livestock. As a reprisal, this group of herders might then attack the community of farmers. From the ACLED notes:

- *'20 were killed when Fulani cattle ranchers clashed with regional farmers in Jos following a land dispute.'*
- *'Violent clash between farmers and nomads'*
- *'Fulani herdsmen and farmers clash in Nassarawa State. Seventy houses burnt down, over 400 families displaced.'.*

B. Education

Nigeria established Universal Primary Education (UPE) in 1976. Reviews of the policy in 1981 and 1990 led to a '6-3-3-4' course of study denoting six years of primary education followed

by three years of junior secondary education. Depending on student characteristics, one would then undertake three years of a technical education or three years of senior secondary education. Some of those in the latter group would then proceed to four years of tertiary education. Universal Basic Education (UBE) replaced the UPE in 2004. The UBE introduced the '9-3-4' educational system with six years of primary education for children between 6 and 11 years of age and three years of junior secondary school for those between 12 and 14. Taken together, they comprise the nine years of free and (nominally) compulsory education and so the merging of the previous first two levels implies a greater expectation of sustained enrollment. The child then follows the path of either a technical school or a senior secondary education (each lasting three years) followed by four years of study at a tertiary institution.

Figure 4 shows secondary school enrollment (capturing the last six years of nominally compulsory education) over time using data from the World Development Indicators. Enrollment peaked in 2013 and then declined as both BH conflict and FH conflict had become more prominent by this time.

Figure 4: Second School Enrollment



3. Empirical Model

We utilize a difference-in-difference approach that models educational completion as a function of conflict. The treated group consists of those individuals who were of compulsory schooling age after 2009 and so born between 1995 and 2003. This cohort would have been of schooling age during the BH conflict as well as during the upturn in FH conflict. The degree of violence (if any) suffered from these conflicts would have depended on location as some communities experienced more conflict than others. The control group consists of those that were of schooling age before 2009, specifically those born between 1985 and 1991. We begin in 1985 as opposed to an earlier year so as to keep the control group more similar in age to that of the treatment group at the time of the survey. In summary, the treatment group consists of individuals within the ages of 6 and 14 while the control group consists of those within the ages of 18 and 24 as of 2009. If conflict hampered education, then those within the treated group

should see a decline in educational attainment that is increasing with the degree of conflict they experienced.[2]

We consider two related specifications similar to that in Bertoni et al. (2019)[3]. The first is:

$$Y_{ihst} = \pi + \gamma BH_{ih} * T_{ihs} + \lambda \mathrm{FH}_{ih} * T_{ihs} + \delta BH_{ih} + \theta FH_{ih} + \phi Female_{ihst} + \beta_t + S_s + \varepsilon_{ihst} \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable, Y_{ihst}, is the completed years of education of individual *i* in household *h* who resides in state *s* and born in year *t*. BH_{ih} and FH_{ih} denote the BH and FH conflict intensities, measured as the sum of the number of incidents within a 10 km radius from 2009 to 2018 . T_{ihst} indicates if individual i belongs to the treated group as defined above. Conflict between 2009 and 2018 could have affected educational outcomes of those of schooling age during this time but should not have impacted educational attainment for older individuals who were now no longer of schooling age. Comparing the coefficients γ and λ can determine if these two types of conflict have similar effects on completed years of education. $Female_{ihst}$ is a dummy indicating gender of individual *i*. The model also includes birth-cohort dummies, β_t, state dummies, S_s. These birth-cohort dummies not only control for age of individual *i* but also for factors that can vary over time impacting all individuals. State dummies control for other local conditions impacting educational completion. The error term is represented by ε_{ihst}.

[2] The dichotomy between control and treated is not as exact as in Bertoni et al. (2019) who consider only BH conflict because no BH occurred prior to 2010 as BH did not exist. FH conflict, on the other hand, goes back centuries. However, to the extent that the control group is not free from conflict then our estimation will underestimate the effect of FH conflict on educational outcomes thereby understating its true impact.

[3] Specifically, see equation (2) in Bertoni et al. (2019).

Of note is that *BH* and *FH* are also included (1) without the interaction term. The coefficient on *BH* should be zero since this conflict did not exist for the control group. However, Bertoni et al. (2019) found a positive coefficient for *BH*. A possible explanation is that BH targeted communities where educational outcomes were higher. Although some FH conflict did occur before 2009, its intensity was much lower than it was for the treated group, which would presumably lead to a small (or zero) coefficient on *FH*. If the coefficient on *FH* is large, a possible explanation is that conflict is more likely to occur on productive lands, the same type of lands that allow for greater income and so for more educational completion. Therefore, the inclusion of *BH* and *FH* (without the interaction terms) in the model can control for factors that could have made each type of conflict more likely and so would have otherwise biased the coefficients on *BH*T* and *FH*T*.

A concern with (1) is the lack of other control, especially household characteristics that could be associated with the prevalence of conflict as well as educational completion. For example, some ethnic or religious groups could have both been more subject to conflict and show differences in educational completion. To address this concern, we also consider the specification:

$$Y_{ihst} = \pi + \gamma BH_{ih} * T_{ihs} + \lambda \mathrm{FH}_{ih} * T_{ihs} + \phi Female_{ihst} + \beta_t + H_h + \varepsilon_{ihst} \quad (2)$$

which includes a set of household dummies, H_h. These dummies control for all household characteristics common to multiple individuals within the household. (They also subsume the state dummies and the *FH* and *BH* conflict variables without the interaction terms). These include ethnicity, religion, parental characteristics, and size of the household. Given the presence of these household dummies, the coefficients γ and λ will stem from within-household variation. Some household members would have been of schooling age prior to 2009 and some afterwards. Of course, the ____ observations with only a single individual will not contribute to identifying γ and

λ. Therefore, we consider (1) and (2) as complementary. Results from equation (2) stem from the within-household variation that arises whereas (1) also incorporates between-household variation.[4]

4. Data

We merge two datasets, the General Household Survey (GHS) and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). GHS is a nationally representative survey with four waves between 2010 and 2019. We use data from the fourth wave, carried out between 2018/2019 which covers approximately 5,000 households and 26,557 individuals. We focus on this last wave since the increase in FH conflict followed the third wave and so use of this last wave allows for greater variation across households in the type and degree of conflict that affected them.[5] With geocodes from the two datasets, we match households with conflict events from ACLED. We focus on two types of conflict, BH and FH, beginning in 2010 with the BH insurgency. Since ACLED provides various details regarding a conflict event, we employ different measures for the degree of conflict such as number of conflict events and the number of fatalities.

[4] One could include household controls in (1) to account for at least some household characteristics. However, missing data would then reduce the sample size. Therefore, we prefer to retain the full sample in (1) recognizing that we will implicitly incorporate these controls in (2).

[5] Unfortunately, the fourth wave differs to a large extent from the prior three waves, especially in the composition of households. This difference in households creates several limitations. First, they prevent combining the datasets into a panel where time invariant household characteristics can be controlled with fixed effects. The difference in sampled households also leads to more missing data. In the first three surveys, missing data from one survey year can be 'filled in' with data from other survey years for characteristics such as religion that would be unlikely to change across surveys. Finally, use of just the fourth wave prevents a longitudinal approach such as what Bertoni et al. (2019) used when considering changes in enrollment across surveys.

Like Bertoni et al. (2019), we categorize a household experiencing a conflict event if the conflict event occurs within a set radius of the household. We do not base our measure by local government area (LGA) where one would assign a conflict event to a household if the event falls within the same LGA as the household as in Adelaja and George (2019).[6] A shortcoming of doing so is that individuals residing at the border of an LGA might be affected more by conflict events in the neighboring LGA than by conflicts in their own LGA. We focus on a 10km radius but will consider a 20 km radius as a robustness check.

Educational attainment for individual j is measured by j's number of completed years of education. We consider individuals who were of compulsory schooling age in 2010 and then examine to what extent conflict affected how many years of schooling were then attained.

Summary statistics are presented in table 1. Average years of completed education exceeds its counterpart from Bertoni et al. (2019) of 5.2 years given the greater educational attainment in the middle of the country compared to the northeast.

The summary statistics for conflict reveal another interesting distinction between BH and FH conflict. With a 10km radius, the number of BH incidents averaged 3.1. Doubling the radius to 20km increases the average number of incidents to 4.1, a third more. Conversely, the number of FH incidents goes from 1.1 to 2.5, more than doubling. Likewise, mean fatalities for BH goes from 21 to 31, about a 50% increase, whereas FH fatalities goes from 5.2 to 13.4, over a 150% increase. Looking at the maximum provides more striking distinctions for FH conflict when the radius increases in length. These differences can be explained, once again, by the nature of the two conflicts. With BH more likely to strike particular targets, extending the range beyond these

[6] The LGA is a sub-national administration level after the state, which is synonymous to the county administrative level in the United States.

targets is less relevant for the summary statistics. Contrastingly, FH conflict is less concentrated and so increasing the radius is more likely to include additional incidents and fatalities. A similar story arises when looking at the standard deviation. They are higher for FH conflict, again suggesting that BH was more focused in its targets, hitting some locations often while passing over others.

5. Results

Table 2 presents the baseline results. Column 1 presents results from (1) whereas column 2 shows results from (2) using intensity as the conflict measure. Columns 3 and 4 provide the same regressions except fatalities replaces intensity. dent is female, and the age of the student. Column 3 contains additional controls, including the age of the household head, the number of years of education of the household head, and the gender of the household. The coefficient on *BH* is not significant. Unlike Bertoni et al. (2019) we do not find that attacks were more likely to occur where completion is more prevalent. The positive coefficient on *FH* signifies that FH attacks were more likely to occur on more productive – that is, more valuable – land.

The key coefficients are those from the interaction terms indicating how conflict during one's schooling-age years – the treated group -- could have impacted educational outcomes. The coefficient on *BH*Treated* does not remain significant between the two specifications. It is positive (albeit, not always significant in later regressions) in (1) but negative in (2). Given that (2) controls for household characteristics, we place more weight on the (2). Nevertheless, the coefficient on *FH*Treated* is an order of magnitude greater than its counterpart on *BH*Treated*, suggesting that FH conflict was more disruptive on educational outcomes given the same number of conflict incidents. The result from the Wald test presented at the bottom of the table documents that the difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant.

To put the coefficient estimates into perspective, the coefficient of -0.01 on the *BH*Treated* interaction term suggests that ten BH conflict incidents within that location lowers the years of completed education by 0.1 years. 4.1% of all locations and 29.9% of locations having at least one BH conflict incident experienced ten or more BH conflict incidents. The coefficient of -0.1 on the *FH*Treated* interaction term predicts that ten FH conflict incidents (comprising 2.1% of all locations and 6.8% of locations experiencing at least one FH conflict incident) lowers completed years of education by a full year. These statistics once again show that BH conflict is more concentrated. However, the coefficient estimates imply that locations with concentrated FH conflict see much greater reductions in completed years of education.

Why do stronger results arise for FH conflict, implying a stronger relationship between this type of conflict and a loss in completed years of education? Given that Boko Haram is ideologically opposed to western education, this result could be surprising. One possibility is that Nnaji et al. (2021) find that FH conflict raised food insecurity. Needing to protect resources more important for survival could have drastically taken older children out of schools, perhaps even more so than fearful of direct attacks on the schools, themselves. This could be especially true for communities living at subsistence levels.

A concern when comparing the effects of BH and FH conflict is that these conflicts differed spatially with BH conflict concentrated in the northeast and FH conflict being more prominent in the central regions of Nigeria. Educational completion has historically been greater in this central region. The mean level of education for our sample is nearly double than its counterpart in Bertoni et al. (2019) who focus on only the northeast region of Nigeria, suggesting that the added regions of our analysis have higher educational attainment. Perhaps conflict has greater negative effects where people have more opportunity to otherwise pursue education. A related explanation is that

FH conflict is not more disruptive ceteris paribus but that the measured effect is larger since completion levels can fall more where they are initially higher. Table 3 presents results when the sample is limited to the northeast region, the same region used in Bertoni et al. (2019). The findings remain qualitatively the same as coefficient estimates for the interaction terms are meaningfully higher for FH conflict.

Table 4 presents similar regressions as does Table 2 but uses a 5km radius and a 20km radius, respectively, to encompass conflict incidents and fatalities. To save space, only the coefficient estimates for the conflict variables are presented. The main result holds, namely that the association between conflict and completed years of education is stronger for FH conflict. However, results are not as strong when using either of these alternatives compared to a 10km radius. This is not surprising given longer radii as, presumably, more distant households would be less affected by conflict. The weaker results for 5km suggest that the effects of conflict – at least, FH conflict – do not quickly dissipate with distance. If people between 5km and 10km away from the site of the conflict still feel its effects then coefficient estimates should be smaller for 5km since distinctions between those 'nearby' and 'far from' the conflict are not as stark.

Finally, table 5 considers differences across gender, using the triple interaction terms: *BH*Treated*Female and FH*Treated*Female*. Results suggest that BH conflict affect males and females similarly. This finding differs from that in Bertoni et al. (2019) where males were more affected at least in some specifications. Stronger evidence arises that FH conflict more greatly affects males. One possibility is that males were more likely to participate in the conflict as they would have traditionally been more likely to protect property.

6. Conclusion

Conflict, depending on its nature, could have different effects on the educational attainment of those exposed to it. To determine if these distinctions arise, this study examines the effects of two conflicts in Nigeria on educational attainment. Unlikely Bertoni et al. (2019) we find less evidence that BH conflict lowered educational attainment. One possibility is that our later sample period includes times when BH conflict had dissipated. Moreover, households would have had more time to adapt. Perhaps effects of low-level conflict – that is, conflict where attacks only occur from time to time – wane over time as people become accustomed to them. We find stronger evidence for negative effects from FH conflict. This type of conflict for resources fought by otherwise civilian combatants appears to have more pernicious effects. Therefore, conflicts over resources could have more negative effects on long-run outcomes than those that are more ideologically driven involving combatants with specific agendas. These findings also suggest that the effects of conflict could differ greatly depending on the nature of the conflict and the reasons behind it. An implication is that applying results from one country or time period to another could be inappropriate, thereby limiting to what extent results from a particular case study generalize or can be applied to other settings.

Appendix: The Parallel Trend Assumption and Validity of Empirical Methodology

The validity of a difference-in-difference estimation strategy is that the outcomes for both treated and control groups will have the same (or at least parallel) trend in the absence of the treatment. While this cannot be ascertained for certain, we examine the validity of this assumption using the

method from Bertoni et al. (2019) by regressing completed years of education on treatment LGAs. An LGA takes the value one if a conflict incident arises in the LGA and takes the value zero if no conflict incident occurs. We also include a set of year dummies for years before the conflict as well as interactions of the treated LGA dummy and year dummy. The results are presented in appendix table A.1. None of the interaction terms are significant indicating that no differences arise between treatment and control groups before the conflict occurred.

A second diagnostic test uses a placebo where the treatment group comprises an older set of individuals born between 1978 to 1984. Their years of completion should not be influenced by subsequent conflict since they would have exceeded schooling age prior to the onset of BH conflict and the rise of FH conflict. The results in table A.2 show that none of the interaction terms are significant. No evidence arises that their completed years of education was affected by factors associated with later conflict. Taken together, the results in tables A.1 and A.2 support the validity of our empirical approach.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable Name	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Years of Education	6659	10.11	3.90	0	18
Treated	7717	0.52	0.50	0	1
Female	7717	0.51	0.50	0	1
Conflict Measures					
BH_Int(10km)	7717	3.09	23.53	0	278
BH_Fat(10km)	7717	20.88	118.64	0	1176
FH_Int(10km)	7717	1.08	3.15	0	37
FH_Fat(10km)	7717	5.21	21.35	0	231
BH_Int(5km)	7717	0.71	3.99	0	50
BH_Fat(5km)	7717	7.11	48.66	0	684
FH_Int(5km)	7717	0.49	2.59	0	35
FH_Fat(5km)	7717	2.46	16.66	0	224
BH_Int(20km)	7717	4.13	25.96	0	304
BH_Fat(20km)	7717	30.53	140.43	0	1334
FH_Int(20km)	7717	2.47	4.73	0	100
FH_Fat(20km)	7717	13.42	52.71	0	906

Note: 'Int' denotes number of conflict incidents and 'Fat' denotes number of fatalities within the radius given in the variable name.

Table 2: Baseline Results

	Conflict Incidents		Conflict Fatalities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
*BH(10km)*Treated*	0.005*	-0.012**	0.001	-0.002**
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)
*FH(10km)*Treated*	-0.091***	-0.113***	-0.012***	-0.018***
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.004)	(0.005)
BH(10km)	-0.010		0.002	
	(0.034)		(0.003)	
FH(10km)	0.109**		0.009*	
	(0.043)		(0.005)	
Female	-0.691***	-0.784***	-0.670***	-0.784***
	(0.106)	(0.145)	(0.105)	(0.145)
Birth Cohort dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State dummies	Yes	No	Yes	No
Household dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes
Obs	6,659	6,659	6,659	6,659
R-Squared	0.267	0.827	0.267	0.826
Wald Test	11.460***	13.537***	8.072***	14.170***
*BH(10km)*Treated* = *FH(10km)*Treated*	(128.650)	(74.258)	(90.653)	(77.763)

Note: The dependent variables are conflict incidents and fatalities. The conflict variables – *BH* and *FH* are conflict incidents and fatalities within 10km radius of household clusters. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. For Wald test result, the t-stat is reported while the sum of square values are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** signifies significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Table 3: Results Using North Subsample

	Conflict Incidents		Conflict Fatalities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
*BH(10km)*Treated*	0.004	-0.012**	0.000	-0.002**
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)
*FH(10km)*Treated*	-0.097***	-0.119***	-0.014***	-0.019***
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.004)	(0.005)
BH(10km)	-0.009		0.002	
	(0.011)		(0.003)	
FH(10km)	0.102**		0.011**	
	(0.041)		(0.005)	
Female	-1.120***	-1.316***	-1.088***	-1.312***
	(0.166)	(0.190)	(0.166)	(0.190)
Birth Cohort dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State dummies	Yes	No	Yes	No
Household dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes
Obs	3,667	3,667	3,667	3,667
R-Squared	0.253	0.830	0.254	0.830
Wald Test	9.157***	12.437***	8.565***	13.147***
*BH(10km)*Treated* =	(128.84)	(77.642)	(120.41)	(82.096)
*FH(10km)*Treated*				

Note: The dependent variables are conflict incidents and fatalities. The conflict variables – *BH* and *FH* are conflict incidents and fatalities within 10km radius of household clusters. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. For Wald test result, the t-stat is reported while the sum of square values are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** signifies significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Table 4: Results from Different Neighborhood Radii

	Conflict Incidents		Conflict Fatalities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
*BH(5km)*Treated*	0.007	-0.012	0.000	-0.001
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.001)
*FH(5km)*Treated*	-0.037	-0.085***	-0.005	-0.014***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.004)	(0.004)
*BH(20km)*Treated*	0.006**	-0.010**	0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
*FH(20km)*Treated*	-0.076***	-0.081***	-0.005***	-0.005**
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Birth Cohort dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State dummies	Yes	No	Yes	No
Household dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes
Obs	6,659	6,659	6,659	6,659

Note: The dependent variables are conflict incidents and fatalities. The conflict variables – *BH* and *FH* are conflict incidents and fatalities within 10km radius of household clusters. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** signifies significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Table 5: Differences in Education Completion across Gender

	Conflict Incidents		Conflict Fatalities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
*BH(10km)*Treated*Female*	-0.012	0.004	-0.003	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.003)
*FH(10km)*Treated*Female*	0.225***	0.132	0.023***	0.007
	(0.051)	(0.097)	(0.007)	(0.009)
*BH(10km)*Female*	0.008	0.001	0.000	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.003)
*FH(10km)*Female*	-0.091**	-0.013	-0.009*	0.002
	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.005)	(0.005)
*BH(10km)*Treated*	0.011***	-0.014**	0.001	-0.003**
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.001)
*FH(10km)*Treated*	-0.209***	-0.179**	-0.023***	-0.021***
	(0.052)	(0.074)	(0.006)	(0.007)
BH(10km)	-0.014		0.001	
	(0.011)		(0.003)	
FH(10km)	0.168***		0.015**	
	(0.057)		(0.007)	
Female	-0.720***	-0.868***	-0.684***	-0.830***
	(0.112)	(0.154)	(0.108)	(0.152)
Birth Cohort dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State dummies	Yes	No	Yes	No
Household dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes
Obs	6,659	6,659	6,659	6,659
R-Squared	0.270	0.827	0.612	0.621
Wald Test				
*BH(10km)*Treated* = *FH(10km)*Treated*	16.16***	4.67**	11.90***	5.48**
Wald Test				
*BH(10km)*Treated*(1+Female)* = *FH(10km)*Treated*(1+Female)*	0.52	0.42	0.01	4.19**

Note: The dependent variables are conflict incidents and fatalities. The conflict variables – *BH* and *FH* are conflict incidents and fatalities within 10km radius of household clusters. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. For Wald test result, the t-stat is reported while the sum of square values are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** signifies significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Table A.1: Testing for Parallel Trend

	Coefficient	Std Error
Year1985*affectedlga	-1.903	2.244
Year1986*affectedlga	-0.483	1.931
Year1987*affectedlga	-0.636	2.157
Year1988*affectedlga	2.269	2.282
Year1989*affectedlga	-1.719	2.038
Year1990*affectedlga	-3.458	2.099
Year1991*affectedlga	-1.610	1.922
Affected LGAs	2.138	1.727
Year Birth Dummies	Yes	
No of Obs	381	

Note: Dependent Variable is Completed Years of Education. No coefficient estimates are significant at 10% level.

Table A.2: Placebo: Older Cohort Going to School Prior to Rise in Conflict

	Incidents		Fatalities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
*BH(10km)*Treated*	0.0001	0.001	-0.0004	-0.0001
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.003)
*FH(10km)*Treated*	-0.024	-0.039	-0.003	-0.005
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.007)	(0.007)
BH(10km)	-0.013		0.001	
	(0.013)		(0.003)	
FH(10km)	0.112***		0.015**	
	(0.043)		(0.006)	
Female		-1.24***		-1.21***
		(0.162)		(0.164)
Birth Cohort dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State dummies	Yes	No	Yes	No
Household dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes
Obs	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812
R-Squared	0.292	0.320	0.292	0.319
Wald Test	0.302	0.821	0.251	0.610
*BH(10km)*Treated* = *FH(10km)*Treated*	(4.254)	(11.1)	(3.538)	(8.262)

Note: The dependent variables are conflict incidents and fatalities. The conflict variables – *BH* and *FH* are conflict incidents and fatalities within 10km radius of household clusters. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. For Wald test result, the t-stat is reported while the sum of square values are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** signifies significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.